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  OPINION
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BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises important questions
of construction of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 at 66 (1996).
Plaintiff Robert Spruill is an inmate in the
custody of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections.  Spruill filed a civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
four defendants at the State Correctional
In s t i t u t io n  a t  C oa l  T ow nsh ip ,
Pennsylvania: two prison officials (Frank
Gillis and Stephen Gooler1); a prison
doctor (Dr. Shawn McGlaughlin); and a
    1Spruill in his complaint spells the
name “Goolier,” but we will use the
correct spelling, “Gooler.”
2prison physician’s assistant (Brian Brown).
In his complaint, Spruill alleges that, as a
result of the deliberate indifference of the
defendants, his serious back condition was
left untreated, or was inadequately treated,
resulting in excruciating pain and
susceptibility to other injuries.  Pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Inmate Grievance System
Policy (the “Grievance System Policy”),
Spruill filed a series of three inmate
grievances, and he ultimately received
some measure of medical care.  In his
grievances, Spruill did not seek money
damages, but in the instant suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, he does seek money
damages for the alleged violation of his
rights under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), enacted as part
of the PLRA, provides that a prisoner may
not bring a § 1983 suit with respect to
p r i s o n  c o n d i t i o n s  “ u n t i l  s u c h
administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.”  Because Spruill had failed
to seek money damages in his grievances,
the District Court concluded that he had
failed to meet the exhaustion requirement
of § 1997e(a), and therefore dismissed
Spruill’s suit in its entirety.  The District
Court also held in the alternative that
Spruill’s failure to name Brown in his
grievances constituted a failure to exhaust
his claims against Brown.  Spruill appeals
the dismissal of his claims against Gooler,
Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown.  He does
not appeal the dismissal of his suit against
Gillis.
Courts have only recently begun to
define the contours of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement, and we have not
had occasion to pass on whether the
exhaustion requirement is merely a
termination requirement or also includes a
procedural default component—that is,
whether a prisoner may bring a § 1983 suit
so long as no grievance process remains
open to him, or whether a prisoner must
properly (i.e., on pain of procedural
default) exhaust administrative remedies
as a prerequisite to a suit in federal court.
This case requires us to confront that issue,
and we hold that § 1997e(a) includes a
procedural default component.  We further
hold that the determination whether a
prisoner has “properly” exhausted a claim
(for procedural default purposes) is made
by evaluating the prisoner’s compliance
with  the prison’s a dm inistrative
regulations governing inmate grievances,
and the waiver, if any, of such regulations
by prison officials.
Applying this framework to Spruill’s
grievances under the Grievance System
Policy, we hold that (1) Spruill was not
required to seek money damages in his
grievances, and therefore has not
procedurally defaulted his claim for money
damages; (2) Spruill was required to name
Brown in his grievances, but that the
officials handling Spruill’s grievances
waived his default on this requirement;
and  (3 )  Spru il l  exhaus t e d  the
administrative remedies under the
Grievance System Policy.
Finally, turning to the merits-based
arguments that the defendants advance as
alternate grounds for affirmance of the
District Court, we conclude that Spruill
3does not state a claim for deliberate
indifference against Gooler, but that his
allegations against Dr. McGlaughlin and
Brown are sufficient to withstand a motion
to dismiss.  We will therefore affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for
fur ther proceedings  aga ins t  D r.
McGlaughlin and Brown.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
As this case comes to us on the District
Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we
must accept as true the facts as pled in
Spruill’s complaint.  E.g., Bd. of Trs. of
Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v.
Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir.
2002).  Given that the exhaustion issue
turns on the indisputably authentic
documents related to Spruill’s grievances,
we hold that we may also consider these
without converting it to a motion for
summary judgment.2  See Steele v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1212
(10th Cir. 2003) (quoting GFF Corp. v.
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130
F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting
that “a defendant may submit an
indisputably authentic [document] to the
court to be considered on a motion to
dismiss”)).  We now chronicle the facts as
set forth in Spruill’s complaint.
A.  Spruill’s Complaint
Spruill is currently incarcerated at the
State Correctional Institution at Chester,
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Chester”), but he has
been housed in at least two other facilities.
His complaint alleges that, shortly after he
was transferred to the State Correctional
Institution at Coal Township, Pennsylvania
(“SCI-Coal”) in May 2001, the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs and subjected him to unnecessarily
painful medical treatment.  Named as
defendants in the complaint are Frank
Gillis, the Superintendent at SCI-Coal;
Lieutenant Steven Gooler, the Unit
Manager of the Restricted Housing Unit
(RHU) at SCI-Coal, where Spruill was
housed during the events at issue; Dr.
Shawn McGlaughlin, a prison physician;
and Brian Brown, a physician’s assistant.
On May 2, 2001, Spruill was
transferred from the State Correctional
Institution at Rockview (SCI-Rockview),
Pennsylvania to SCI-Coal, where he was
housed in the RHU.  Upon his arrival,
Spruill immediately requested to see a
medical staff member about severe pain he
was experiencing in his lower back area
and his right leg.  “Several hours later,” he
    2Strictly speaking, the motion acted on
by the District Court should not have
been captioned as a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but rather as
a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings, because we
have held that failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under § 1997e(a)
is an affirmative defense.  See Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002). 
There is no material difference in the
applicable legal standards, so for the sake
of familiarity, we shall use the “motion
to dismiss” formulation of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b).
4was interviewed by a nurse.  After Spruill
described his pain, and stated that he
“suffers from a chronic and debilitating
lower back disorder, spondylotic spinal
stenosis with recurrent compression of L3
and/or L4 nerve root on right,” the nurse
said, “There is nothing I can do, you will
need to sign up for sick call.”
Spruill signed up for sick call on May
3, but the next morning, he fell due to a
severe pain in his leg and back, striking the
left side of his face on the metal toilet in
his cell.  Spruill believes he was knocked
unconscious and also injured his right
thumb.  That same day, May 4, he
informed the nurse of his fall, his
additional injuries, and continuous back
pain; the nurse said that she would inform
the doctor.  Spruill also informed Gooler
about his fall, to which Gooler responded,
“so, what do you want me to do?”  Spruill
filed an official inmate grievance on May
4 complaining about the fall and new
injury.  Gooler did not notify health care
providers once he was informed of
Spruill’s injuries; at that point, Spruill had
yet to be examined by a medical doctor.3
    3The grievance filed by Spruill dated
May 4, 2001, reads as follows:
On the above stated date at
approx. 5:35 a.m., this writer
attempted to get up out of the bed. 
I took perhaps approximately 3 to
4 short steps, wherein, at that
juncture, this writer received
and/or experienced an extremely
sharp pain in the lower back & as
well as severe pain up and down
the front and back sides of the
right leg.  It was at that point this
writer fell to the floor in a forceful
manner, hitting the left side of my
face on the edge of the “metal”
toilet in the cell.  This writer did
as well also jammed and/or
injured his right thumb in the
same fall.  This writer has reason
to believe that he may have passed
out due to the forceful blow he
received to the left side of his face
when he fell.  This writer has
made repeated request, prior, to
see the doctor, only to be told that
the doctor does not visit the RHU. 
To date, and even in light of this
writer’s sick call request and most
recent fall incident, this writer has
yet to be examined by this
institution’s doctor and/or RHU
security staff.  This writer also
informed RHU Lt. Goolier, about
the aforementioned fall.  His reply
was: so, what do you want me to
do.  The writer finds Lt. Goolier
said remarks to be highly
unprofessional.  He is required to
notify medical respecting this
writer’s fall and blow to the head. 
What must I do, die, before I can
get medical attention?
In response to the prompt on the
grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken
and staff you have contacted, before
submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:
5On May 5, Dr. McGlaughlin came to
Spruill’s cell regarding the sick call
request.  Dr. McGlaughlin refused to
examine Spruill and stated that Spruill
would never go to the infirmary.  Spruill
filed a second grievance on May 6
complaining that McGlaughlin had failed
to conduct a physical examination of him.4
Spruill was seen by the physician’s
assistant, Brown, on May 7.  At that
encounter, Brown accused Spruill of
faking his injuries and did not examine
him.  On May 9, Spruill complained to the
nurse that the pain medication he was
prescribed for his back5 “wasn’t working,”
and later that morning Spruill experienced
another “extremely sharp pain” in his
Submitted sick call request(s)
about back pain, spoke to the
nurse(s) about my back pain and
seeing the doctor—they said that
it was nothing they could do, and
that the doctor will not come to
the RHU to see me.  I spoke to Lt.
Goolier about my situation, he
demonstrated no “care” or
concern regarding my health
and/or well being.
    4The grievance filed by Spruill dated
May 6, 2001, reads as follows:
This writer avers the following: I
was seen on 5-5-2001, by a
member of the medical staff
whom identified himself as the
institutional medical “doctor.”  I
explained to the doctor that I
suffer from a “chronic back
disorder” and currently experience
severe pain around my lower back
& right leg.  And that I had fallen
in the cell the day prior, “hitting
my face on the metal toilet & also
hurting my right hand in said fall. 
Moreover, I advised the doctor
that my fall was directly related to
my not being able to walk—due to
the continued severe pain I am
having.  More pointedly, the
aforementioned doctor never once
conducted a physical examination
in which to determine the full
extent of my pre-existing back
condition or the injuries I
sustained relative to my fall on 5-
4-2001.  In addition, said doctor’s
visit to the RHU with me lasted
approximately 30 seconds maybe
less.  To date, I am still
experiencing a considerable
amount of pain.
In response to the prompt on the
grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken
and staff you have contacted, before
submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:
Spoke to nurses and RHU staff
members who stated there’s
nothing they can do.  I will need
to submit a grievance.
    5It is not clear from Spruill’s
complaint whether this medication was
prescribed by an SCI-Coal physician, or
by a physician from SCI-Rockview, from
which Spruill had just been transferred.
6lower back and leg which caused him to
fall again.  Spruill submitted another sick
call request, and was seen on May 10 by
Brown in response to that request.  Spruill
told Brown that “the current medication
was not working to reduce his pain,” but
Brown did not take any actions to help
him.  Spruill submitted another sick call
request on May 11, following which he
was seen by Dr. McGlaughlin on May 12.
Dr. McGlaughlin stated that he did not
believe there was anything wrong with
Spruill’s back, and accused Spruill of
“playing games.”  Spruill filed a third
grievance that day.6
On May 14, Dr. McGlaughlin had
Spruill brought into the medical
e x a m i n a t io n  r o o m,  w h e r e  D r .
McGlaughlin deliberately bent and twisted
Spruill’s legs “as if he was trying to shape
a pretzel.”  Dr. McGlaughlin did not
examine Spruill’s face or thumb for
injuries sustained on the morning of May
4.
The grievances were consolidated and
denied upon Initial Review, and Spruill
filed administrative appeals.  The first
appeal was denied, and Spruill filed a final
appeal, which was also denied.  The stated
    6The grievance filed by Spruill dated
May 12, 2001, reads as follows:
This writer avers that at
approximately 8:34 a.m. on the
above indicated date, SCI-Coal
Chief Medical Director Dr.
McGlaughlin, came to my cell
regarding my sick call request. 
Dr. McGlaughlin stated to me:
that I had been evaluated back in
“February 2001,” by Dr. Osgood,
who has said that I am pain-free,
and that there’s nothing wrong
with my back.
In addition: Coal’s Chief Medical
Director stated to this writer that
this: “brings an end to your little
back playing games.”  This writer
contends that Dr. McGlaughlin’s
remarks as stated herein above
were highly unprofessional in this
particular instance, since he has
never conducted any physical
examination on this writer.
To date, this writer remains in
constant sever[e] pain.  And Dr.
McGlaughlin’s continued
course of treatment that he knows
is painful & ineffective may soon
entail a substantial risk of me
seriously harming myself in this
cell “falling.”
In response to the prompt on the
grievance form to “[l]ist actions taken
and staff you have contacted, before
submitting this grievance,” Spruill wrote:
Spoke to officer Shay—“Pod
officer” who indicated that it is
very little if anything at all he
could do, the matter will need to
be addressed by medical or by
way of the grievance system.
7reasons behind the denials were that
Spruill was, at the time, receiving
appropriate medical care.  As our
rescription of the grievances demonstrates,
see supra notes 3, 4 & 6, Spruill did not
seek monetary relief from the prison, nor
do the grievances identify Brown by name
or by description.
B.  Proceedings in the District Court
Spruill filed the present suit seeking
monetary and injunctive relief.  Because
Spruill had by then been transferred to
SCI-Chester, the District Court held that
his claim for injunctive relief against
officials at SCI-Coal was moot under
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206-
07 (3d Cir. 1993).  The District Court
granted all four defendants’ motions to
dismiss on several grounds, holding, inter
alia, that (1) Spruill’s failure to seek
money damages in his grievances
constituted a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (2) because
Spruill received adequate medical
treatment, he had stated no claim for a
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights;
and (3) Spruill had failed to exhaust his
claim against Brown because the
grievances did not name Brown.
C.  This Appeal
Spruill appeals the dismissals of Lt.
Gooler, Dr. McGlaughlin, and Brown, but
does not appeal the dismissal of
Superintendent Gillis.  The District Court
had jurisdiction over this action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343, as a suit
arising under a federal law securing civil
rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Spruill filed a
timely notice of appeal from the final order
dismissing the action and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
exercise plenary review over a district
court’s decision to grant a motion to
dismiss.  Broselow v. Fisher, 319 F.3d
605, 607 (3d Cir. 2003).  To the extent that
our review turns on the statutory
construction of the exhaustion requirement
in § 1997e(a), our review is also plenary.
Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347,
1352 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “the
scope of § 1997e(a)’s applicability, which
is a question of law” is subject to plenary
review); see also Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d
65, 66 (3d Cir. 2000).
The defendants advance several
grounds on which to affirm the judgment
of the District Court.  First, they argue that
Spruill’s failure to seek money damages in
his grievances precludes him from now
seeking damages in federal court.  Second,
Brown argues that Spruill’s failure to
name him in the grievances is a failure to
exhaust.  Third, all defendants argue that
Spruill has not alleged facts sufficient to
establish a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.7  We will treat each of
these arguments in turn.
II.  Exhaustion Under the PLRA
    7Gooler captions this issue as a
qualified immunity defense, which it is
not.  The substance of his argument is
that Spruill’s complaint does not
establish that Gooler acted with a mental
state of deliberate indifference.
8A.  The CRIPA
In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980).  CRIPA § 7 (originally codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1997e)  took several steps to
foster the development of administrative
grievance systems in prisons: First, it
directed the Attorney General to
promulgate, after consultation with others,
“minimum standards for the development
of a plain, speedy, and effective system for
the resolution of [inmate] grievances.”
CRIPA § 7(b)(1).  Second, it directed the
Attorney General to set up a certification
program for inmate grievance systems.
CRIPA § 7(c).  Third, it gave District
Courts discretion to continue (i.e. stay) §
1983 cases brought by prisoners “in order
to require exhaustion of such plain,
speedy, and effective administrative
remedies as are available.”  CRIPA § 7(a).
The Supreme Court “described this
provision as a ‘limited exhaustion
requirement.’” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 523-24 (2002) (quoting McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1992));
see also Concepcion, 306 F.3d at 1352.
B.  The PLRA
This  regime of discretionary
continuance to exhaust administrative
remedies lasted until the 1996 enactment
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
at 66 (1996).  Section 803(d) of the PLRA
amended CRIPA § 7 to, inter alia, remove
the standards-setting and certification roles
of the Attorney General, and replace the
discretionary continuance provision with a
mandatory dismissal provision:
No action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under
section 1979 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are
exhausted.
PLRA § 803(d) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) and amending CRIPA § 7(a)).
As the Supreme Court explained in Nussle:
[This] exhaustion provision differs
markedly from its predecessor.
Once within the discretion of the
district court, exhaustion in cases
covered by § 1997e(a) is now
mandatory.  All “available”
remedies must now be exhausted;
those remedies need not meet
federal standards, nor must they be
“plain, speedy, and effective.”
Even when the prisoner seeks relief
not avai lable  in  grievance
proceedings, notably money
damages ,  exhaus t ion  i s  a
prerequisite to suit.  And unlike the
prev io us  p rov i s ion ,  w hic h
encompassed only § 1983 suits,
exhaustion is now required for all
“action [s] . . . brought with respect
to prison conditions,” whether
under § 1983 or “any other Federal
law.”
534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth v. Churner,
9532 U.S. 731, 739-41 & n.5).
Several courts have recounted the
legislative history of the PLRA, and we
need not do so once again.  See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598-99
(7th Cir. 2003) (Ripple, J., concurring in
the judgment); Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d
95, 106 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d sub nom.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002);
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-
25 (11th Cir. 1998).  The Supreme Court
summarized the objectives of the
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA in
Nussle:
Beyond doubt, Congress enacted §
1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner
suits; to this purpose, Congress
afforded corrections officials time
and opportunity to address
com plaints  internally before
allowing the initiation of a federal
case.  In some instances, corrective
action taken in response to an
inmate’s grievance might improve
prison administration and satisfy
the inmate, thereby obviating the
need for litigation.   In other
instances, the internal review might
“filter out some frivolous claims.”
And for cases ultimately brought to
court, adjudication could be
facilitated by an administrative
record that clarifies the contours of
the controversy.
534 U.S. at 524-25 (quoting and citing
Booth, 532 U.S. at 737).  With this
background to guide us, we turn next to
interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion
requirement.
C.  Exhaustion and Procedural Default
We have previously addressed the
applicability of § 1997e(a) to actions by
prisoners who have filed suit in federal
court before pursuing all avenues of relief
available to them within their prison’s
inmate grievance system.  In Nyhuis, 204
F.3d 65, we held that an inmate seeking
relief that the prison’s administrative
grievance system cannot provide (in
Nyhuis, it was money damages) must
nonetheless pursue the grievance process
to its end before coming to federal court.
We concluded that the PLRA “make[s]
exhaustion of all administrative remedies
mandatory.”  Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
The question we now consider is whether
“all administrative remedies” are
exhausted whenever there is no further
process available to the inmate within the
grievance system (which would happen if,
say, an inmate fails to file an
administrative appeal), or whether it is
necessary that the inmate reach this
endpoint having availed himself of every
process at every turn (which would require
all appeals to be timely pursued, etc.).  Put
another way, we ask whether the PLRA
requires simple exhaustion or something
more—“proper” exhaustion, as it were.
To borrow terms from other areas of the
law that recognize an exhaustion
requirement, we consider whether the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is merely
a termination requirement, or also includes
a procedural default component.
10
We recognize that there is an emerging
split among the circuits on whether the
PLRA includes a procedural default
component.  Compare Ross v. County of
Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181,1186 (10th Cir.
2004) (“[T]he PLRA, like 28 U.S.C. §
2254, contains a procedural default
c o n c e p t  w i t h in  i t s  e x h a u s t i o n
requirement.”), and Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied 537 U.S. 949 (2002), with Thomas
v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[W]e hold that so long as an
inmate presents his or her grievance to
prison officials and appeals through the
available procedures, the inmate has
exhausted his or her administrative
remedies, and a prison’s decision not to
address the grievance because it was
untimely under prison rules shall not bar
the federal suit.”).
1.  The Procedural Default Component of
the PLRA
The Supreme Court has observed in the
federal habeas corpus context that an
exhaustion requirement without a
procedural default component is quite
toothless.   To “protect the integrity of the
federal exhaustion rule, [federal habeas
courts] ask not only whether a prisoner has
exhausted his state remedies, but also
whether he has properly exhausted those
remedies, i.e., whether he has fairly
presented his claims to the state courts.”
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848
(1999) (quotation marks and citations
omitted) (emphasis in original).
[A] habeas petitioner who has
failed to meet the State’s
procedural requirements for
presenting his federal claims has
deprived the state courts of an
opportunity to address those claims
in the first instance.  A habeas
petitioner who has defaulted his
federal claims in state court meets
the technical requirements for
exhaustion; there are no state
remedies any longer “available” to
him.  In the absence of the
independent and adequate state
ground doctrine in federal habeas,
habeas petitioners would be able to
avoid the exhaustion requirement
by defaulting their federal claims in
state court.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732
(1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28
(1982)).
The value of a procedural default rule
for enforcing an exhaustion requirement is
obvious.  For example, both state criminal
processes and prison administrative
grievance systems normally include time
bars; without the backstop of a procedural
default rule, an aggrieved prisoner could
evade § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement
by simply letting the time to present his
grievance expire, and a habeas petitioner
could likewise evade 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)’s exhaustion requirement by not
timely appealing within the state court
system.  There are many other points at
which an aggrieved prisoner or a habeas
petitioner could similarly deprive the
prison grievance system or state court
11
system, respectively, of the opportunity to
fairly consider his claim.
The analogy is far from perfect,
though.  For one thing, the Supreme Court
has consistently located the procedural
default component of federal habeas law in
the “independent and adequate state
ground” doctrine, see, e.g., Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002); Coleman, 501
U.S. at 729, a doctrine that, in the habeas
context at least, “is grounded in concerns
of comity and federalism,” id. at 730; see
also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,
453 (2000); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520
U.S. 518, 523 (1997).  It is at least possible
that the comity-and-federalism rationale
(and hence the “independent and adequate
state ground” rule) applies with greater
force to defaults in state judicial
proceedings than it does to defaults in state
administrative proceedings.  Another
problem with uncritically importing
principles from federal habeas doctrine
into this context is that in other federal
statutory schemes—most prominently,
employment discrimination claims under
the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)—the Supreme Court has not
interpreted an exhaustion-like requirement
to imply a procedural default component.8
    8Section 14(b) of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 633(b),  provides that, in states
that have a “State authority” authorized
to enforce state laws against age
discrimination (known as “deferral
states”), an ADEA private plaintiff may
not bring a federal lawsuit “before the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings
have been commenced [before the State
authority].”  In Oscar Mayer & Co. v.
Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979), the Supreme
Court concluded that this provision
(which is parallel to § 706(c) of Title
VII, see Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 755-
56) makes “resort to administrative
remedies in deferral States by individual
claimants . . . mandatory, not optional.” 
Id. at 758.  In substance, then, section
14(b) implies a sort of exhaustion
requirement, because aggrieved parties in
deferral states must at least commence
the available state administrative
proceedings.  The Oscar Mayer Court
went on, however, to also hold that
section 14(b) does not authorize the
denial of federal relief in the face of a
state procedural default.  441 U.S. at
758-65.  Thus, section 14(b) does not bar
a suit by an ADEA plaintiff in a deferral
state who does not avail himself of the
available state administrative process, or
only seeks to invoke that process after a
state time limit for doing so has expired. 
In short, the Court explained, “state
procedural defaults cannot foreclose
federal relief.”  Id. at 762.  Thus, the
ADEA has an exhaustion requirement
but no procedural default component.
But like the federal habeas corpus
analogy, the Oscar Mayer analogy is
imperfect.  Oscar Mayer emphasizes that
relief before a state agency is based on
state law, and “independent [of] federal
relief.”  441 U.S. at 761.  Thus, ADEA
relief operates substantively in parallel
with state relief, even though section
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The competing analogies of federal
habeas corpus and federal civil rights law
are developed in greater detail in the
majority and dissenting opinions in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion on the same exhaustion question
we consider here.  See Thomas, 337 F.3d
720 (Moore, J.); id. at 737 (Rosen, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in the
judgment).  Suffice it to say that we find
neither position entirely satisfactory.  But
the foregoing discussion at least suggests
that an exhaustion rule can (though need
not) be fairly read to include a procedural
default component.  Therefore, the best
course, we think, is to examine Congress’s
policy objectives in enacting § 1997e(a),
and to evaluate whether those are better
served by a procedural default rule, or the
absence of one.
We believe that Congress’s policy
objectives will be served by interpreting §
1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement to
include a procedural default component.
Based on our earlier discussion of the
PLRA’s legislative history, see supra Part
III.B, Congress seems to have had three
interrelated objectives relevant to our
inquiry here: (1) to return control of the
inmate grievance process to prison
administra tors; (2) to encou rage
development of an administrative record,
and perhaps settlements, within the inmate
grievance process; and (3) to reduce the
burden on the federal courts by erecting
barriers to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
Each of these goals is better served by
interpreting § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion
language to include a procedural default
component than by interpreting it merely
to require termination of all administrative
grievance proceedings.
All three goals are obviously served by
a procedural default rule because such a
rule prevents an end-run around the
exhaustion requirement, and thereby
creates an overwhelming incentive for a
prisoner to pursue his claims to the fullest
within the administrative grievance
system.  There are subtler benefits too: A
procedural default rule enhances the
integrity of prison administration because
it ensures prisoner compliance with the
specific requirements of the grievance
system.  A procedural default rule ensures
that an administrative record will be
developed in the best fashion (i.e., under a
grievance system designed to create just
such a record), and that the possibility of
settlement will be explored within a
14(b) encourages that, procedurally, they
be pursued consecutively.  In contrast, §
1997e(a) is addressed only to “[§ 1983
and] any other Federal law.”  While
relief is to be pursued consecutively
under § 1997e(a) (first in the prison
grievance system, and then in federal
court), the substantive rights are
exclusively federal in character.  If the
PLRA charged state prison authorities
with remedying only state law, we might
find the parallel to the ADEA more
persuasive; but in the PLRA regime state
prison authorities are called upon to
remedy violations of federal law.
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framework where prison administrators
will be receptive to settlement.  Finally,
Congress wanted to erect any barrier it
could to suits by prisoners in federal court,
and a procedural default rule surely
reduces caseloads (even though it may be
a blunt instrument for doing so).
2.  Measuring Procedural Default
Having concluded that, as a matter of
statutory construction, § 1997e(a) includes
a procedural default component, we must
identify the source of the rules that a
prisoner must follow to avoid procedurally
defaulting his claim.  Judge Easterbrook
has aptly referred to this question as “the
choice of law issue.”  Strong v. David, 297
F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002).  He
elaborates:
Very few courts have addressed
what things an administrative
grievance must contain, and none
has attended to the choice-of-law
issue.  Courts—and presumably
litigants too—have assumed that
the general objectives that inspired
§ 1997e(a) also determine how a
prisoner must go about exhausting
state remedies.  The sixth circuit,
for example, demands that the
administrative grievance name each
person who ultimately becomes a
defendant.  Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d
493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2001).  In
contrast, the eleventh circuit
requires only that a prisoner include
in a grievance all the information
the prisoner reasonably can be
expected to know; failing to
identify a specific person does not
prevent a later suit against that
person.  Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d
1205, 1208 (11th Cir. 2000).
Presumably the sixth circuit
likewise would require legal claims
to be identified, while the eleventh
would not.  Yet both of these
decisions skip over a vital question:
what body of law governs the
specificity inquiry?
Id.
We agree that this is a critical question:
Is procedural default under § 1997e(a)
governed by express federal law, federal
common law, or by the “law” of the state
prison grievance system (as stated in this
case in the Grievance System Policy)?  By
“federal common law” we refer to some
putative set of rules, or at least general
standards, for assessing whether a
grievance was timely, included a
sufficiently detailed factual account,
requested appropriate relief, etc.  At all
events, we agree with Judge Easterbrook’s
conclusion that prison grievance
procedures supply the yardstick for
measuring procedural default.  Accord
Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025.  This result is
more in harmony with Congressional
policy than creating ad hoc federal
common law, and it is also fairer to
inmates.
To begin with, there simply is no
express federal law describing the
procedural requirements with which
prisoners must comply in satisfying §
1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement.  See
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Strong, 297 F.3d at 649.  As between
crafting judge-made law on this subject
and looking to state prison grievance
procedures, the latter will far better serve
the policy interests of the PLRA.  We have
repeatedly noted above that the legislative
history is clear that the PLRA was
intended to return control of prisons to
wardens; one aspect of this was a
comprehensive program of returning
control of the grievance process.
Mandatory exhaustion (with a procedural
default component) ensures that inmate
grievances will be addressed first within
the prison’s own system—in this respect,
the PLRA  is thus appropriately
defederalizing.  Moreover, Congress
repealed the portions of CRIPA that
established federal standards-setting and
certification for prison grievance systems.
It would be anomalous, to say the least, to
refuse to give effect to the very rules that
the PLRA encourages state prison
authorities to enact.9  Indeed, the
unintended result of making federal
common law on this subject might even be
that prisons would acquiesce in that
federal common law by incorporating it
into their grievance systems.
We also believe that, from a notice and
due process point of view, it is fairer to
hold inmates to a single, consistent set of
procedural rules in pursuing their
grievances.  If we were to create our own
common law on the subject, we would in
effect be asking prisoners to both comply
with prison grievance procedures (to
ensure that the prison will hear their
grievances), while keeping an eye on a
separate set of federal requirements (to
ensure that they will preserve a remedy in
federal court if it comes to it).  The better
approach is to have federal courts
recognize prisoners’ procedural defaults
within the applicable prison grievance
system.10
    9Simply because the rules are
procedural does not somehow lessen the
importance to the prison authority of
having federal courts honor them.  Cf.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730 (explaining
that when a federal habeas court ignores
a state procedural ground for rejecting a
federal claim, “the habeas court ignores
the State’s legitimate reasons for holding
the prisoner”).
    10To be sure, we have previously
suggested that in enacting the PLRA,
“Congress intended to save courts from
spending countless hours, educating
themselves in every case, as to the
vagaries of prison administrative
processes, state or federal.”  Nyhuis, 204
F.3d at 74.  This arose, however, in a
discussion of the reasons that § 1997e(a)
does not include a futility exception
(which would require federal courts to
make predictive inquiries about what
grievances might or might not be futile). 
We are comfortable that evaluating a
procedural default in the course of an
existing and fully developed grievance
will be an order of magnitude less
complex and less fact-intensive than
ascertaining whether a prisoner’s
undeveloped grievance would be futile.
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Finally, we note that just as procedural
default in the federal habeas corpus
context must be predicated on an adequate
(and independent) state ground, see Ford
v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1991),
so too must a prison grievance system’s
procedural requirements not be imposed in
a way that offends the Federal Constitution
or the federal policy embodied in §
1997e(a).  We made the same observation
(albeit in somewhat different terms) in
Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77-78, where we
explained that the policy of § 1997e(a) is
that “compliance with the administrative
remedy scheme will be satisfactory if it is
substantial.”  As the next Part makes clear,
though, we have no occasion in this case to
further elaborate on this aspect of
§1997e(a).
D.  Exhaustion of Spruill’s Claims
The first “exhaustion” question is
whether Spruill has exhausted his
administrative remedies in the literal
sense—whether further avenues of relief
are available to him within the prison’s
inmate grievance process.  None are.  DC-
ADM-804 Part VI provides for three
stages of review within Pennsylvania’s
Grievance System: Initial Review (DC-
ADM-804 Part VI.B), which addresses the
inmate’s filed grievance; the first appeal
from the Initial Review, known as Appeal
to Facility Manager (DC-ADM-804 Part
VI.C); and a second and final appeal, the
Appeal to Secretary’s Office of Inmate
Grievances and Appeals (DC-ADM-804
Part VI.D).  Spruill’s grievances went
through all stages and were denied.  He
has no further administrative process
available.
We turn, then, to the procedural default
component.  Unlike federal habeas corpus
procedural default inquiries under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) and Coleman, where the
federal court typically will have the benefit
of a state-court ruling on whether a
petitioner has procedurally defaulted his
federal claim under state procedural law, a
court reviewing a prisoner’s § 1983 claim
for compliance with § 1997e(a) will have,
at best, a ruling from a prison grievance
appellate body on whether the prisoner
complied with the prison grievance
system’s procedural rules.11  At worst, the
state administrative body will not have
passed at all on the prisoner’s procedural
compliance vel non, and the federal court
must undertake an independent procedural
default inquiry.  This is what we must do
here, for no ruling from the prison
administrators addresses the procedural
implications of Spruill’s failure to
specifically ask for money damages or his
failure to name Brown in his grievances.
Because this exercise is essentially a
matter of statutory construction—it turns
    11Aside from our comments above
about the need for administrative
grievance systems to comport with the
Federal Constitution and the federal
policy of § 1997e(a) to be given effect,
we express no view as to whether, or
under what standard, any such state
administrative determinations of
procedural default would be reviewable
by a federal court.
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on the interpretation of the Grievance
System Policy—it is a question of law over
which we have plenary review.  See Stokes
v. Dist. Attorney, 247 F.3d 539, 540-41 (3d
Cir. 2001).  It is therefore appropriate for
this Court to undertake the inquiry in the
first instance.  See Hudson United Bank v.
LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151,
159 (3d Cir. 1998) (“When a district court
has failed to reach a question below that
becomes critical when reviewed on appeal,
an appellate court may sometimes resolve
the issue on appeal rather than remand to
the district court.  This procedure is
generally appropriate when the factual
record is developed and the issues provide
purely legal questions, upon which an
appellate court exercises plenary review.”
(citations omitted)).
1.  Spruill’s Failure to Ask for Money
Damages
We have reproduced in full the texts of
Spruill’s three grievances.  See supra notes
3, 4 & 6.  None requests money
damages—or any other specific relief for
that matter.  As noted above, the
defendants assert that Spruill cannot now
in federal court seek money damages.  As
we concluded in the discussion above, we
must look to the rules governing the
prison’s grievance system to ascertain
whether Spruill has procedurally defaulted
his claim for monetary relief.  The portion
of the Grievance System Policy that details
what “shall,” “should,” and “may” be
included in a grievance reads:
The inmate shall include a
statement of the facts relevant to
the claim.  The text of the
grievance shall be leg ible,
presented in a courteous manner,
and the statement of facts shall
not exceed two (2) pages.  The
inmate should identify any persons
who may have information that
could be helpful in resolving the
grievance.  The inmate should also
include information on attempts to
resolve the matter informally.  The
inmate may also specifically state
any claims he/she wishes to make
c o n c e r n i n g  v i o l a t i o n s  o f
Department directives, regulations,
court orders, or other law.  The
inmate may include a request for
compensation or other legal relief
normally available from a court.
DC-ADM 804, Part VI.A.1.d (emphasis in
original).
The verbs in this paragraph establish
three tiers of grievance components: items
that are mandatory (“shall”); items that are
required to the extent practicable
(“should”); and items that are optional
(“may”).  A request for money damages
falls in the third category.  Since an
optional procedural provision cannot give
rise to a procedural default, it appears that
Spruill is not now precluded from seeking
money damages.
There is, however, a possible
alternative reading: The sentence at issue
may be addressed not to the written
contents of a grievance, but rather to the
scope of relief available within the
grievance system.  This is not an
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unreasonable matter for a prison grievance
system policy to address; indeed, it was the
absence of a mechanism to recover
monetary relief—in a prior version of the
very grievance system here at issue—that
generated the controversy in Booth, 532
U.S. 731 (holding that the unavailability of
monetary relief through a prison grievance
system does not excuse a prisoner seeking
only money damages from the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement).  See also id. at
734 & n.1 (noting that Pennsylvania’s
grievance system did not provide for
recovery of money damages at the time of
Booth’s grievance, but that it had since
been modified to permit such recovery).
Interpreting the provision above as
establishing the scope of available
relief—and implicitly requiring that the
pr i soner  identi fy the re l ie f  he
seeks—would lead to the conclusion that
Spruill did procedurally default his claim
for monetary relief.
We reject this scope-of-available-relief
reading for several reasons.  First,
grammatically the regulation reads “may
include a request for” and not “may
request.”  Second, the sentence appears as
part of a regulation directing the contents
of the written grievance, not one that
otherwise sets the scope of permissible
relief.  Third, the form itself on which
grievances are filed does not include any
prompt for stating the relief sought.
Furthermore, the regulation does not read
like a regulation that could give rise to a
procedural default for failure to plead
properly for relief.  The regulation quoted
above is far cry from, say, a regulation that
reads, “If the inmate desires compensation
or other legal relief normally available
from a court, the inmate shall request the
relief with specificity in his/her initial
grievance.”
In sum, Spruill cannot be said to have
failed to follow the regulations—and thus
procedurally defaulted—in this respect.
Nothing in the Grievance System Policy
would have put Spruill on notice that he
had to ask for money damages—or any
particular form of relief at all.  Therefore
we conclude that he has satisfied §
1997e(a), and we cannot affirm the District
Court’s dismissal on this failure-to-exhaust
ground.
2.  Spruill’s Failure to Name Brown in
His Grievances
The passage quoted above regarding
the contents of the grievance is also the
only section of the Grievance System
Policy requiring that the grievance identify
specific persons.  On this matter, the text is
mandatory, or nearly so: “The inmate shall
include a statement of the facts relevant to
the claim. . . . The inmate should identify
any persons who may have information
that could be helpful in resolving the
grievance.  The inmate should also include
information on attempts to resolve the
matter informally.”  DC-ADM 804, Part
VI.A.1.d.  To the extent that Brown’s
identity is a “fact[] relevant to the
claim”—and it is—it was mandatory for
Spruill to include it.  To the extent that
Brown was a “person[] who may have
information” or someone with whom
Spruill made “attempts to resolve the
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matter informally”—and he was—Spruill
was required to identify Brown if
practicable.  Spruill did not, and has
offered no explanation for his failure to do
so.  Any grievance against Brown would
now be time-barred.  See DC-ADM 804,
Part VI.A.1.e (“Grievances must be
submitted by the inmate . . . within fifteen
(15) working days after the events on
which the claims are based.”).  Thus
Spruill has procedurally defaulted a claim
against Brown by failing to identify him.
But the prison’s grievance process
excused this procedural default: The
grievance officer’s “Initial Review
Response” (the first-level determination
under the Grievance System Policy)
identified Brown by name.  Although the
response identified Brown only as
someone who had seen Spruill in the
course of his medical visits, it is not to be
expected that a response rejecting Spruill’s
grievances on the merits would identify
any malfeasance on Brown’s part.  The
purpose of the regulation here is to put the
prison officials on notice of the persons
claimed to be guilty of wrongdoing.  As
such, the prison can excuse an inmate’s
failure to do so by identifying the
unidentified persons and acknowledging
that they were fairly within the compass of
the prisoner’s grievance.
The point is close, but we conclude that
the prison grievance officer’s recognition
that Brown was involved in the events that
Spruill complained of excused any
procedural defects in Spruill’s initial
grievances.  Spruill’s grievances and suit
are not about specific instances of
insulting treatment by Brown—there
would be no constitutional violation there
anyway.  Rather, the grievances and the
suit are about a larger-scale denial of
adequate medical care, in which prison
officials clearly knew Brown was alleged
to be implicated.  Thus we reject the
District Court’s dismissal of Spruill’s suit
against Brown on these grounds.
* * *
In closing this Part, we stress that
under § 1997e(a), the warden is
responsible for the grievance system.  If
the warden (or whoever the appropriate
state official may be) is dissatisfied with
the procedural default rulings in this Part,
he or she may alter the grievance system to
require more (or less) of inmates by way of
exhaustion.  Such measures, we reiterate,
must be consistent with the Federal
Constitution and the federal policy
embodied in § 1997e(a) to be enforced as
grounds for procedural default in a
subsequent federal lawsuit.  As we
observed in Nyhuis, 204 F.3d at 77, “if in
the long run, something of a cooperative
ethos can be achieved between inmate and
jailer, the internal administrative process
could prove a less hostile and adversarial
forum than that of federal court.”  We are
likewise hopeful that our holdings today
on procedural default and waiver will not
engender a prison grievance review culture
marked by technicalities, but will instead
foster the cooperative resolution of
legitim ate gr ievances by fur ther
encouraging prisoners to avail themselves
of the forum usually best suited to redress
those grievances.
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III.  Spruill’s Eighth Amendment Claims
Because there is no exhaustion or
procedural default bar to Spruill’s suit, we
turn to the merits of his Constitutional
claims.  We have on several occasions
discussed the conditions under which
deprivation of medical treatment violates
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right not
to be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment.  “Only ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain’ or ‘deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs’
of prisoners are sufficiently egregious to
rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.”  White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976))).  Allegations of medical
malpractice are not sufficient to establish
a Constitutional violation.  See id. (citing
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106); Monmouth
County Correctional Institutional Inmates
v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir.
1987) (MCCII) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106 & n.14; Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428
F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1970)); see also Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-34 (holding
that negligence is not compensable as a
Constitutional deprivation).  “[M]ere
disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment” is also insufficient.  MCCII,
834 F.2d at 346 (citing Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977);
Massey v. Hutto, 545 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir.
1976) (per curiam)).
As we explained in White, the Estelle
“deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs” standard is clearly met when a
doctor is “intentionally inflicting pain on
[a] prisoner[].”  897 F.2d at 109.  In
MCCII, we identified several other
scenarios that satisfy Estelle.  Most
relevant to this case are (1) “[w]here
prison authorities deny reasonable requests
for medical treatment . . . and such denial
exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or
the threat of tangible residual injury,’”
MCCII, 834 F.2d at 346 (quoting Westlake
v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir.
1976)), and (2) “where ‘knowledge of the
need for medical care [is accompanied by
the] . . . intentional refusal to provide that
care,’” id. (quoting Ancata v. Prison
Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th
Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original).
The Estelle standard “‘requires
deliberate indifference on the part of the
prison officials and it requires the
prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.’”
Id. (quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158,
161 (3d Cir. 1978)).  Spruill’s complaint
satisfies the second prong.  First, his back
condition itself has allegedly required
significant and continuous medication, and
has caused him excruciating pain.  Second,
within the brief period described in his
complaint, Spruill claims to have fallen or
collapsed from the pain twice (first on
May 4, and again on May 9), exposing
himself to further injury.  The extreme
pain and real possibility of permanent
injury could qualify Spruill’s condition as
a serious medical need.  Naturally, this
will need to be fleshed out with further
evidence (e.g., expert medical testimony),
but at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the
complaint is certainly adequate in this
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respect.  The closer question is whether
Spruill has alleged facts supporting the
inference that Gooler, Dr. McGlaughlin,
and Brown were deliberately indifferent
(or intentionally malicious) with respect to
his condition.  For reasons that will
become apparent, we treat Gooler first,
and then Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown
together.
A.  Claims Against Gooler
Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1993), resembles the case at bar in
that the plaintiff-prisoner (Durmer) sued
both medical and non-medical prison
officials.  With respect to the non-medical
prison officials, Barker and Fauver, we
explained:
[W]e believe that summary
judgment was proper with respect
to defendants Barker and Fauver.
The only allegation against either
of these two defendants was that
they failed to respond to letters
Durmer sent to them explaining his
predicament.  Neither of these
defendants ,  however,  i s  a
physician, and neither can be
considered deliberately indifferent
simply because they failed to
respond directly to the medical
complaints of a prisoner who was
already being treated by the prison
doctor.
Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).  Although
Durmer was decided at the summary
judgment stage, its holding can be readily
imported into the motion-to-dismiss stage:
If a prisoner is under the care of medical
experts (Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown in
this case), a non-medical prison official
will generally be justified in believing that
the prisoner is in capable hands.  This
follows naturally from the division of
labor within a prison.  Inmate health and
safety  is prom oted by div iding
responsibility for various aspects of inmate
life among guards, administrators,
physicians, and so on.  Holding a non-
medical prison official liable in a case
where a prisoner was under a physician’s
care would strain this division of labor.
Moreover, under such a regime, non-
medical officials could even have a
perverse incentive not to delegate
treatment responsibility to the very
physicians most likely to be able to help
prisoners, for fear of vicarious liability.
Accordingly, we conclude that, absent
a reason to believe (or actual knowledge)
that prison doctors or their assistants are
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a
non-medical prison official like Gooler
will not be chargeable with the Eighth
Amendment scienter requirement of
deliberate indifference.  Thus dismissal of
Spruill’s claims against Gooler after the
point at which Spruill was first under
medical care is appropriate because Spruill
bears the burden of proving (and hence
pleading) facts supporting the defendants’
mental states, see Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t
of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir.
2001), and he has failed to so plead with
respect to Gooler.12
    12We do not find our admonition in
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233-34
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With respect to Spruill’s claims against
Gooler in the period before he was under
medical care—i.e., from his May 2 arrival
at SCI-Coal, through his fall and face
injury on May 4, to Dr. McGlaughlin’s
first visit to his cell on May 5—we also
conclude that Spruill has not stated a claim
against Gooler.  First, Spruill did sign up
for sick call on May 3, and he was seen by
an (unidentified) nurse on May 4; hence he
was receiving a minimal measure of
medical attention.  Second, Spruill does
not allege that his condition was so dire
and obvious that Gooler’s failure to
summon immediate medical attention on
May 4 (and to instead let the sick call
process run its course) amounted to
deliberate indifference.  The facts as
Spruill himself describes them simply do
not amount to the MCCII examples of
“deny[ing] reasonable requests for medical
treatment . . . expos[ing] the inmate to
undue suffering” or “knowledge of the
need for medical care” coupled with an
“intentional refusal to provide that care.”
834 F.2d at 346 (quotation marks and
citations omitted).  Therefore, Spruill has
not stated a claim against Gooler and we
will affirm the judgment of the District
Court dismissing the suit against Gooler.
B.  Claims Against Dr. McGlaughlin and
Brown
Though Spruill’s allegations about Dr.
McGlaughlin’s and Brown’s course of
treatment (or nontreatment) pale next to
the allegations in such cases as White, 897
F.2d 103, Spruill’s complaint nonetheless
sufficiently attributes a mental state of
deliberate indifference (or worse) to both
Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown.  Especially
when read in light of Alston, 363 F.3d at
233-34 & n.6, several excerpts from
Spruill’s complaint suffice to make the
point: Spruill asserts that due to Dr.
McGlaughlin’s and Brown’s “lack of
proper medical care, the plaintiff was
subjected to the possible risks of a
permanent disability or an fatal or serious
injury.”  We have held that “the threat of
tangible residual injury” can establish
deliberate indifference.  MCCII, 834 F.2d
at 346 (quoting Westlake, 537 F.2d at
860).  Spruill further claims that Dr.
M cG laugh l in  and  B row n ac te d
“maliciously and sadistically,” and that
those actions were “intended to inflict pain
on the plaintiff without any medical
justification.”  If proven, intentional
conduct of this sort plainly makes out an
Eighth Amendment violation.  And finally,
& n.6 (3d Cir. 2004), applicable to this
specific point.  In Alston, we reaffirmed
that pro se complaints (especially from
civil rights plaintiffs) should be read
liberally, and noted that prisoners in
particular are often at an informational
disadvantage that may prevent them from
pleading the full factual predicate for
their claims.  Id.  Spruill’s complaint is
lacking not because it fails to allege
specific facts to support Gooler’s mental
state (which, at all events, would be
unnecessary under our notice pleading
standard, see id.), but rather because it
does not so much as suggest that Gooler
was aware of the alleged inadequacies in
Spruill’s medical treatment.
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according to Spruill, Brown and Dr.
McGlaughlin refused to examine him on
multiple occasions and Dr. McGlaughlin
instead accused him of “playing games”;
when Dr. McGlaughlin ultimately did
examine him, he twisted Spruill’s legs “as
if he was trying to shape a pretzel,” and
Spruill “repeatedly told Defendant
McGlaughlin that the examination was
causing additional pain to his back and
leg.”
In sum, Spruill has connected his
factual allegations to the alleged mental
states of Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown.
That he believes their actions were not
only deliberately indifferent, but malicious
and sadistic, reinforces the sufficiency of
his complaint.  Since at this stage we are
making no judgment about what actually
happened, but only about the sufficiency
of the pleadings, we must take Spruill’s
factual allegations, and the reasonable
inferences therefrom, as true.  We will
therefore reverse the District Court’s
dismissal of Spruill’s suit against Dr.
McGlaughlin and Brown.
IV.  Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court
with respect to Gooler will be affirmed on
the ground that Spruill has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted for
a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights by Gooler.  With respect to Dr.
McGlaughlin and Brown, we hold that
Spruill has met the exhaustion requirement
of § 1997e(a), and that he has stated a
claim for violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.  We will therefore
reverse the judgment of the District Court,
and remand for further proceedings, with
respect to Dr. McGlaughlin and Brown.
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